Abstracts of Recent Cases by unknown
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 52
Issue 1 May-June Article 7
Summer 1961
Abstracts of Recent Cases
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Abstracts of Recent Cases, 52 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 85 (1961)
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
will be adopted is a query that only the legislators
and judges can answer.
A final issue raised is whether the husband
would be deprived of the privilege against self
incrimination if his wife voluntarily offered damag-
ing evidence or were compelled to testify against
him. Those who would argue a violation of the
fifth amendment and similar state constitutional
provisions would point to the common law fiction
that husband and wife are legally one person and
conclude that the husband is being forced to
testify against his will. However, to hold that
husband and wife are one person at law would be
to disregard the vast changes in the status of the
woman the extension of her rights and correlative
duties-whereby a wife's legal subversion to her
husband has been wholly wiped out in this coun-
try.714 Accordingly, it may be said that the privilege
74 United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960) (hus-
band and wife held capable of conspiring together in
violation of a federal conspiracy statute).
against self incrimination is not jeopardized by the
incorporation of the proposed evidentiary privilege
into our legal framework.
In conclusion, assuming that the qualified privi-
lege is approved by the lawmakers, it remains for
the court to balance the injury to the marital
relation and the danger of perjured testimony
against the benefit derived from the due admin-
istration of justice in order to resolve whether
to admit or exclude the testimony of the spouse.
There appears to be little, if any, opposition to
such a procedure when utilized to determine the
admissibility of relevant evidence in other casesY5
Surely, the balancing process would not be an
illogical element in our judicial machinery when
applied to the husband-wife privilege.
JACK KIlNGENSMTH
75 State v. Haney, 219 Minn. 518, 18 N.W.2d 315
(1945); Farris v. People, 129 Ill. 521, 21 N.E. 821
(1889); Beyl v. State, 165 Neb. 260, 85 N.W.2d 653
(1957).
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Arrest, Search and Seizure-Robinson v. United
States, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Defendants
were convicted of housebreaking and grand lar-
ceny. On appeal, they contended that the trial
court erred in admitting certain tools as evidence
because the police officers, at the time of their
search of defendants' automobile without a war-
rant, did not have probable cause to believe that
defendants had committed a felony. The Court of
Appeals, affirming the conviction, held that prob-
able cause for the arrest did exist where police
officers stopped defendants' automobile traveling
sixty miles per hour early on a Sunday morning,
and defendants refused to explain coins and a
money bag on the car's floor, revealed when de-
fendants opened the car door. Since the arrest was
valid, the subsequent search resulting in the seizure
of defendants' tools was held to be proper.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-California v.
O'Neill, 10 Cal. Rptr. 114 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
* Senior Law Students, Northwestern University
School of aw.
1960). Defendant was convicted of possessing
heroin. On appeal, he claimed that the trial court
erred in admitting the heroin into evidence because
the police had neither a search warrant nor prob-
able cause for an arrest. The Court of Appeals,
reversing the conviction, held that where the
officers admitted that they lacked knowledge of
their informer's reliability and the defendant had
slammed the door in the officers' faces upon their
seeking admittance, no probable cause for an
arrest or a search existed.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Plat v. State,
341 S.W. 2d 930 (Tex. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of the unlawful possession of morphine.
On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred
in admitting evidence obtained as a result of the
allegedly illegal search of a cabin in which he and
others were found. The Court of Criminal Appeals
affirmed, holding that when, after receiving reliable
information that people in a particular cabin would
be using narcotics, the officer, upon approaching
the cabin and looking through the screen door,
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saw defendant apparently giving himself an injec-
tion of narcotics the search was lawful as an inci-
dent to defendant's lawful arrest made upon
"probable cause" and that in any case defendant
did not have standing to object to the search in
the absence of a showing that the cabin was his
private dwelling.
Bail-Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197
(1960). Defendant applied for bail on personal
recognizance and an elimination of bond, claiming
that he lacked the funds to post the bond. Mr.
Justice Douglas denied the application without
prejudice and held that the Court of Appeals
should hear the appeal, stating that a defendant's
right to freedom pending the final determination
of his case outbalances the government's require-
ment of security, by way of bond which may be
dispensed with in certain circumstances under
FFD. R. CRIm. P. 46(d).
Confessions-Mezzatesta v. State, 166 A.2d 433
(Del. 1960). Defendant and one Williams were
convicted of violating Delaware lottery laws. On
appeal, defendant contended that his silence in
face of an admission by Williams implicating both
of them in the crime could not be admitted in
evidence as an "implied confession" by defendant
because the admission resulted from an accusation
made while defendant was under arrest. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, stating that it would follow
Dean Wigmore's rule that silence under accusation
is admissible evidence even though the accused is
under arrest, provided that the circumstances
were such as would naturally call for reply.
Confessions-Hawaii v. kroshida, 354 P.2d 986
(Hawaii 1960). Defendant was convicted of pro-
curing and pimping. On appeal, he contended that
his confession should not have been admitted
because a confession cannot be used to support a
conviction unless all of the essential elements of
the corpus delicti (in this case inducing the female
and intent to participate in the earnings) have been
established by independent proof, and that with-
out his confession, the evidence failed to prove
that he intended to obtain a portion of the prosti-
tute's earnings. The Supreme Court, affirming the
conviction, held that in Hawaii full proof of the
corpus delicti, without regard to the confession, is
not necessary if the circumstances assure the
trustworthiness of the confession; here, the inde-
pendent evidence at least tended to prove de-
fendant's intent, and thus consideration of the
confession with the other evidence was warranted.
Demonstrative Evidence - California v.
Robillard, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. 1960). Defend-
ant was convicted of murder in the first degree.
On appeal, he claimed that the trial court erred in
permitting the use of a manikin to illustrate the
path of the bullets fired into the deceased's body.
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction hold-
ing that in a bench trial the manikin was a proper
use of demonstrative evidence, even if it had some
prejudicial effect, because it tended to clarify the
circumstances of the crime and prove a material
fact, i.e., that the murder was a cold-blooded
icilling.
Double Jeopardy-United States v. Gori, 282
F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1960). Defendant was convicted
of knowingly receiving and possessing goods stolen
in interstate commerce. On appeal, he contended
that where he had neither requested nor consented
to a mistrial, but merely did not protest it, he was
subjected to double jeopardy by being tried a
second time. The Court of Appeals, affirming the
conviction, held that the discontinuance of the
first trial to which defendant had not protested
did not support a claim of double jeopardy because
defendant had not been harmed by the first trial
and had accepted the benefits of the new trial
granted by a judge who had been overzealous in
protecting defendant's rights. Judge Waterman
dissented.
Double Jeopardy-Boyle v. State, 170 N.E.2d
802 (Ind. 1960). Defendant was convicted in the
Sullivan County Court of operating an automobile
upon a highway in Sullivan County while under
the influence of liquor. On appeal, he contended
that he had been placed in double jeopardy because
he had previously been tried and acquitted by the
Vigo County Court on a charge arising out of the
same act for which he was tried and convicted in
the Sullivan County Court, except that the first
affidavit charged him with operating a vehicle in
Vigo County and the second charged him with
operating a vehicle in Sullivan County. The Su-
preme Court, by an equally divided court, affirmed
the conviction, two judges holding that defendant
[Vol. 52
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could not be tried a second time for the offense of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of liquor even though defendant had allegedly
committed the same offense in two separate
counties, one judge concurring on the ground that
the continuous operation of a motor vehicle in two
or more counties while under the influence of
liquor constituted a single offense subject to the
rule of double jeopardy but finding that defendant
failed to provide sufficient evidence to sustain his
defense of former jeopardy, and one judge holding
that two separate crimes had been charged since
one was alleged to have occurred in Vigo County
and the other in Sullivan County.
Double Jeopardy-Coffey v. State, 339 S.W.2d 1
(Tenn. 1960). Defendant, a police officer, was con-
victed of assault and battery upon, and official
oppression of, a private citizen. On appeal, he con-
tended that his conviction for these two crimes
constituted double jeopardy. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment in the official oppression
case but set aside the judgment in the assault and
battery case and abated that suit, holding that
where two or more offenses of the same nature are
by statute carved out of the same transaction,
and are properly the subject of a single investiga-
tion, an acquittal or conviction for one of the
offenses bars subsequent prosecution for the
others.
Fair Trial Procedure-Dyson v. United States,
283 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed by a jury of robbing a national bank. On
appeal, he contended that the trial court erred in
permitting the prosecution to comment on de-
fendant's failure to deny or explain incriminating
facts when defendant only testified as to material
facts concerning his innocence. The Court of
Appeals, affirming the conviction, held that
although defendant's counsel told the jury that
defendant would only be asked to testify in order
to show whether the confession was voluntarily
given, the questions, in fact, displayed defendant's
intent to deny his guilt before the jury. Under
such circumstances the prosecution could properly
comment on defendant's testimony.
Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum-Carbo v.
United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 338 (1961). After being
arrested for extortion and posting bond before a
federal district court in California, defendant went
to New York where he was convicted of three mis-
demeanors and given a two year prison term. Sub-
sequently, defendant moved to quash a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum issued by the
California court to the New York prison directing
the return of defendant to California for trial,
but the motion was denied. On appeal, he daimed
that the California federal court lacked the power
to direct the writ to an officer located outside the
territorial limits of its jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C.A. §2241. The Supreme Court denied the
motion to quash, holding that a court's ability to
issue the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
extended throughout the entire country and that
although 18 U.S.C.A. §2241 merges all writs of
habeas corpus, the territorial limits in the statute
only refer to habeas corpus ad surjiciendum (inquiry
into the cause of restraint). Chief Justice Warren
and Mr. Justice Black dissented.
Immunity from Prosecution-Reina v. United
States, 81 Sup. Ct. 260 (1960). Defendant was con-
victed of criminal contempt for refusing to answer
questions before a federal grand jury. On appeal,
defendant contended that Congress only intended
to grant immunity from federal, and not state
prosecutions when it enacted 18 U.S.C.A. §1406
(which grants immunity from prosecution to wit-
nesses compelled to testify before federal grand
juries investigating violations of federal narcotics
law) because to grant state immunity would make
the statute unconstitutional under the tenth
amendment. The Supreme Court, affirming the
conviction, held that Congress could, under federal
supremacy, constitutionally grant immunity from
state, as well as federal, prosecution. Mr. Justice
Black and the Chief Justice dissented on other
grounds.
Insanity-People v. Bender, 169 N.E.2d 328
(Ill. 1960). Defendant was convicted of armed
robbery. On appeal, he contended that he was
deprived of due process of law when the lower
court instructed the jury at a pre-trial saniity
hearing concerning fitness to stand trial that the
burden of proving defendant's insanity rested
upon defendant. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, holding that when the defendant raises
a reasonable doubt as to his sanity then the
burden is upon the State to prove defendant's
19611 87
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sanity by a preponderance of the evidence and
that the lower court's instructions were therefore
erroneous.
Juries-Fisher v. Georgia, 116 S.E.2d 641 (Ga.
1960). After being convicted of an offense, defend-
ant moved for a new trial which was denied. On
appeal, he contended that during the course of the
trial, two bailiffs escorted the jury to a hotel where
each occupied a room with one juror and did not
see the ten remaining jurors until the next morning.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded hold-
ing that when bailiffs fail to supervise and attend
the jury at all times, the case must be retried
irrespective of whether harm to the defendant is
shown to have resulted.
Juries-Contee v. State, 165 A.2d 889 (Md. 1960).
Defendant, a Negro, was convicted of raping a
white woman. On appeal, he contended that it was
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to ask
prospective jurors, on voir dire, the questions he
had submitted with respect to possible racial bias
or prejudice and to allow the prosecutor to con-
stantly refer to the prosecutrix as a "white girl."
The Court of Appeals, reversing on the ground
that it was error to deny defendant the oppor-
tunity of submitting proper questions relating to
racial bias or prejudice to be propounded by the
court to prospective jurors on voir dire, stated
also that the trial court should have cautioned the
State's Attorney to desist from making remarks
calculated to evoke racial prejudice or should have
admonished the jury to disregard the reference to
racial matters.
Manslaughter-State v. Fennewald, 339 S.W.
2d 769 (Mo. 1960). Defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. On appeal, he contended that he
could not be guilty of manslaughter, although he
had agreed with one Schweppe to have an auto-
mobile race, because the act of culpable negligence
causing the death of the driver of a third car was
not defendant's act but the act of Schweppe. The
Supreme Court, reversing and remanding on other
grounds, stated that defendant could properly be
found guilty of manslaughter by reason of entering
into the agreement to conduct an automobile race
and doing so in a reckless manner whereby the
death of a third party resulfed.
Prejudicial Remarks By Prosecutor-Montana
v. Peterson, 356 P.2d 925 (Mont. 1960). Defendants
were convicted by a jury of a misdemeanor. On
appeal, they contended that they were denied the
right to a fair trial when the trial judge permitted
the prosecution to interrupt the defense attorney's
direct examination of a witness to state that he
wished to bring his secretary into the courtroom
to take the testimony down so as to have it avail-
able in case of possible perjury. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that the prosecu-
tion's insinuations and threats in the presence of
the jury were so prejudicial that they could not
be cured by the court's admonition to the jury
that the statements should be disregarded.
Receiving Stolen Property-McCoy v. State,
170 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of receiving stolen goods from two minors.
On appeal, she contended that the affidavit was
defective in that it alleged that the property was
"feloniously" stolen by minors and therefore
erroneously charged the minors with having com-
mitted the felony of grand larceny when in fact
they were subject to the juvenile laws. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding, that the word
"feloniously" may be considered surplusage, that
the word "stolen" (which appears in the Indiana
statute defining the crime of receiving stolen
goods) has a broad meaning and would apply to
property unlawfully taken by minors subject to
the juvenile laws, and that another section of the
statute further provides that in any prosecution
for the offense of receiving stolen property "it
shall not be necessary on the trial thereof to prove
that the person who stole such property had been
convicted."
Right to Counsel-People v. Friedrich, 169
N.E.2d 752 (Ill. 1960). Defendant was convicted
of the crime of conspiracy to fraudulently obtain
the assets of another's estate. On appeal, defendant
contended that he was deprived of his constitu-
tional right to counsel of his own choice because
the trial judge had refused to allow him to engage
the services of the same attorney who represented
another member of the alleged conspiracy on the
ground that a conflict of interest existed between
the co-conspirators (as evidenced by a motion for
a severance) and that the Canons of Ethics would
be violated-if the same attorney were to represent
conspirators who could not agree upon a joint
trial. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
holding that conflicts of interest which authorize
a severance do not necessarily preclude the same
[Vol. 52
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attorney from representing both parties under
Canon 6 of the Canon of Ethics of the Illinois
State Bar Association and even if the interests of
the two conspirators were so adverse that they
should have been represented by separate counsel,
either conspirator had the unquestioned privilege
to waive his right to separate counsel.
Self-Incrimination-In Re Greenspan, 187 F.
Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue moved for an order adjudicating
the defendant in contempt of court. Defendant
contended that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation should apply to corporate books and
records when the corporation embodies a purely
personal interest as when there is but one stock-
holder in the company. The District Court, com-
pelling defendant to produce the records or be held
in contempt, held that the privilege against self-
incrimination only applies to natural persons and
that irrespective of the fact that defendant was the
sole stockholder of the corporation, he, as agent of
the corporation, could not invoke the privilege.
Speedy Trial-Moore v. Hand, 356 P.2d 809
(Kans. 1960). After being convicted of issuing
worthless checks, defendant applied for a writ of
habeas corpus which was denied. On appeal, he
claimed that he was entitled to his release because
his right to a speedy trial under §10 of the Kansas
Bill of Rights and his right to discharge under
Kansas law, G.S. 1949, 62-1432, had been violated
because three terms of the court had passed be-
tween the filing of the information in 1957 and the
bringing of the defendent to trial in 1959. The
Supreme Court, affirming the denial of defendant's
application, held that where a defendant had -
voluntarily pleaded guilty at the time of trial in
1959, he had waived any rights relating to a speedy
trial and any right to discharge under the Kansas
statute.
Testimony Under the Influence of Tranquilizers
-Washington v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323 (Wash.
1960). Defendant was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death. On appeal, he claimed that a
new trial should be granted because the jury would
not have condemned him to death if it had not
been for his casual appearance and lackadaisical
attitude which had been caused by a medical
trustee giving the defendant tranquilizers imme-
diately preceding the trial, and defendant's not
being aware of their effect. The Supreme Court
granted a new trial holding that the jury's decision
to impose the death penalty may have been influ-
enced by the defendant's attitude and appearance,
and that since defendant may have been affected
by thie tranquilizers, administered under these
circumstances, his right to a fair trial was impeded.
Wiretapping-Simons v. O'Connor, 187 F. Supp.
702 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Plaintiff sued a New York
district attorney for damages arising from defend-
ant's tapping of plaintiff's telephone without the
latter's consent and in violation of §605 of the
Federal Communications Act (but under a state
court order authorizing such wiretapping). On
defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff contended
that she had a private right to damages against a
state officer for intercepting and divulging her
phone call without her assent, even though he was
discharging his official responsibilities. The Dis-
trict Court granted the motion to dismiss holding
that since the state court permitted the wire-
tapping (performed for purposes of obtaining evi-
dence to prosecute plaintiff for jamming phone
lines of another with intent to interfere with his
business), the officer in performing his duty was
immune from civil action.
Witnesses-Froman v. State, 339 S.W.2d 601
(Ark. 1960). Defendants were convicted of rob-
bery. On appeal, they contended that their con-
viction could not stand because the only testi-
mony that tended to show that they committed
the crime was that of one of the defendant's girl
friends who allegedly was an accomplice since she
participated in the crime by waiting in the auto-
mobile near the scene of the crime while the
robbery was perpetrated, by knowing the crime
was committed, by permitting the defendants to
go to her apartment and divide the money obtained
in the robbery, by harboring the men in her apart-
ment, and by not telling anyone about the crime
for a year. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the evidence established that the witness was
an accomplice as a matter of law and since there
was no corroborating evidence, the lower court's
judgment could not stand in view of the fact that
it was based solely on her testimony. One judge
dissented.
Witnesses-Central Mutual Insurance Company
v. D. & B., Inc., 340 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1960.).
The insured recovered judgment under a mercan-
19611
